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COMMENT
BACK TO REALITY: WHAT "KNOWINGLY" REALLY MEANS AND THE INHERENTLY SUBJECTIVI
NATURE OF THE MENTAL STATE REQUIREMENT IN ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL LAW.
The president of the company knows all of the facts surrounding the repeated dumping of hazardous chemicals
generated by his business, but he has seldom actually done the dumping himself. He approaches one of his supervisors,
and tells him, "we are going to need the truck tomorrow to pick up another load" of hazardous waste so the truck had
better be empty. The supervisor tells him that there was no room left in their storage tanks and no drums to pump the
material into. When the supervisor asks him what to do with the truckload of waste already inside the truck, the president,
says "this is a job that I hired you for, you handle it." Immediately after his conversation with the president, the supervisor
pumped the truck's contents, hazardous solvents, directly onto the ground.'
INTRODUCTION
This Comment evaluates the interpretation of mens rea requirements in contemporary federal environmental
criminal law3. Part I explores the subjective meaning of the "knowingly" mens rea and compares its "traditional"
definition to that in an environmental context. Part II examines the distinction between a "knowingly" mens rea and the
absence of subjectivity as embodied in a strict liability standard. Part III addresses arguments of some courts and
commentators who argue that environmental laws are ambiguous and therefore the Rule of Lenity should be applied. Part
IV defends the propriety of felony level penalties for violations of environmental laws. Finally, Part V evaluates
alternatives to direct evidence by implying knowledge of relevant facts via the Willful Blindness and Responsible
Corporate Officer Doctrines.
I. KNOWINGLY -WHAT DOES IT MEAN?
As the Supreme Court noted in Morrissette:
"The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or
transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the
human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil."
In a free society, we govern behavior of individuals through criminal sanctions. As our system has evolved over time, we
have developed distinctions among mental states in order to punish behavior according to its culpability.5 Pursuant to
these goals, Congress has enacted massive regulatory programs that use criminal sanctions to protect the public and the
environment against the 'ills of the industrial revolution,' like unsafe products and environmental pollution.6 In order to
achieve such goals, Congress provided for criminal sanctions for more egregious derelictions from the law, like those
punished in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.7
As a general proposition, ignorance of the law is not an excuse. This notion is based on the common law
presumption that the law is definite and knowable.9 The Supreme Court in Lambert v. California stated that:
"The rule "ignorance of the law will not excuse" ... is deep in our law, as is the principle that of all the
The above fact pattern is based upon U.S. v. Greer, 850 F.2d 1447. 1451 (11th Cir. 1988)2 Blacks Law Dictionary defines mens rea, "[a]s an element of criminal responsibility: a guilty mind; a guilty or wrongful purpose; a criminal
intent." Black's Law Dictionary 985 (6th ed. 1990).
The primary laws reviewed in this Comment are: Resource Recovery and Recovery Act §§ 6901-6992k, 42 U.S.C. 1002 (1986); Clean Water
Act §§ 1251-1387, 33 U.S.C. 101 (1987): Clean Air Act §§ 7401-7671q, 42 U.S.C. 101 (1990).
4 Staples v. U.S., 511 U.S. 600, 606, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 128 L. Ed. 2d 608 (1994) quoting Morrisette, 342 U.S. at 250.
Staples, 511 U.S. at 605; LaFave et al., Criminal Law § 3.5 (West 2d Ed. 1986).
6 Morrissette, 342 U.S. at 253-54.
U.S. v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 666 (3d Cir. 1984).
8 LaFave et al., Criminal Law, §5.1 at 407 (West 2d Ed. 1986)
9 Cheek v. U.S., 498 U.S. 192. 199, Ill S. Ct. 604, 112 L. Ed. 2d 617 (1991).
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powers of local government, the police power is "one of the least limitable." ... On the other hand, DueProcess places some limits on its exercise. Ingrained in our concept of Due Process is the requirement of
notice.
In Lambert, the Supreme Court considers an ordinance that required "convicted criminals" to register with the Police
when they came to town." The court invalidated the ordinance because where there was "no proof of probability of suchknowledge, a person may not be convicted consistently with Due Process. Were it otherwise, the evil would be as great asit is when the law is written in print too fine to read or in a language foreign to the community."1 2 As a society, we charge
all people with constructive knowledge of our laws, but where criminal sanctions are involved, due process demandsproper notice.
Congress deals with the issue of notice by requiring a "willfully" mens rea to be used for certain crimes that are of
a technical and complicated nature. In heightening the level of culpability to be convicted of a crime, Congress and theCourts require proof of some "wrongful purpose."13 While acknowledging that the term 'willfully' means different thingsin different contexts, the Ratslaf Court quotes Liparota that:
"On occasion, criminal statutes - including some requiring proof of 'willfulness' - have been understood
to require proof of an intentional violation of a known legal duty, i. e., specific knowledge by thedefendant that his conduct is unlawful. But where that construction has been adopted, it has been invoked
only to ensure that the defendant acted with a wrongful purpose."' 4
The Courts and Congress use this standard to protect against criminalizing "otherwise innocent conduct." 5
In the criminal tax evasion context, the Supreme Court in Cheek found that a "willfully" standard was appropriate
when the defendant was not aware of the specific code section that made his conduct illegal. 6 The Court noted that thereis a traditional exception in the tax fraud context to a lower mens rea because of the complexity of the Internal RevenueCode.'7 While conceivably a broadly applicable concept, Federal courts since Cheek decline to extend this idea beyond taxfraud crimes.' 8
In a recent article, Joshua D. Yount argues that since environmental legislation and the regulations that interpretthem are so incredibly complex, courts should apply a standard similar to 'willfulness' in the environmental criminal
context.' 9 Yount points out that:
"Many important provisions are buried in mountains of regulations. Furthermore, many of the
requirements are published in memos, preambles, and other informal publications, a practice that subverts
the notice and comment process and creates an "underground environmental law." Interpreting such a
morass of overlapping and occasionally conflicting statutes, regulations, and policy statements asks too
much in the criminal context." 20
While conceptually and superficially attractive, there is no reason to extend Cheek to environmental crimes. First,
requiring heightened mens rea requirements would clearly undermine the Congressional purpose stated in the express
21language in recent amendments to environmental legislation. Second, Federal courts have already held that such an
10 Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
" Id.
12 Id.
'0 Ratslafv. U.S. 510 U.S. 135, 142, 114 S. Ct. 655, 126 L. Ed 2d 615 quoting Liparota v. U.S., 471 U.S. 419, 426.85 L. Ed. 2d 434, 105 S. Ct.2084 (1985).
14 Id.
1s Staples, 511 U.S. at 611.
16 Cheek, 498 U.S. at 199.
17Id.
See generally U.S. v. Hildebrandt, 961 F.2d 116 (8th Cir. 1992).
Joshua D. Yount, The Rule of Lenity and Environmental Crime, 1997 U. Chi. Legal F. 607. 621 (1997) citing Kathleen Brickey. EnvironmentalCrime at the Crossroads: The Intersection of Environmental and Criminal Law Theory (Washington University School of Law Working Paper No96-4-1, 1996) at I5.
20 Id.
21 U.S. v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 540 (2d Cir. 1995).
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extension of a heightened construction, even to other tax cases, is inappropriate.22 The 8th Circuit in Hildebrandt found
that Cheek rested on a violation of a specific section; since the case before the court involved a general criminal provision,
a higher mental state would be inappropriate. This type of provision is highly analogous to environmental criminal
provisions that have a general section delineating different categories of violations as illegal. Since these provisions are
fewer in number and cover violations of many subsections, they more conspicuously give notice to an actor of their illegal
activity.
Third, whereas the Tax Code considers and provides for prosecution of both individual and corporate taxpayers,
environmental statutes are primarily intended to affect the behavior of corporate actors. The 'willfully' exception found
in both Liparota and Staples were in the context of a single individual not engaged in significant commercial enterprise.
In contrast, the vast majority of criminal environmental prosecutions have been against individuals engaged in significant
commercial enterprise; these persons are the ones who make the decisions about handling hazardous materials and are
more culpable.
A mens rea of 'knowingly' solely requires that a person be aware of their action; this standard is distinguishable
from a mens rea of 'willfully' that requires a person to actually be aware of the law or regulation in question and
intentionally transgress it.25 The distinction is the difference between "general" and "specific" intent; the former merely
26
requires an awareness of the facts while the latter requires an intent to achieve a further goal. According to the Model
Penal Code § 2.02(2)(b) (1962), "A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i)...
the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct of that nature or
that such circumstances exist." The Supreme Court decision in U.S. v. Bailey serves as a general guide for the meaning of
27
a 'knowingly' mens rea. The defendants in Bailey violated federal prison law when they escaped from a federal
penitentiary while awaiting trial. The defendants were not required to have specific knowledge of the law they
transgressed, but merely that they were aware of their actions, (leaving the jail), and that they were aware of the attendant
circumstances, (that they were not authorized to do so).29 In reversing the Court of Appeals below, the Supreme Court
held that the 'knowingly' standard did not require a conscious objective of violating the law; it meant merely an
awareness of conduct. 30
In a broader sense, 'knowingly' does not require the higher standard of being aware of the requirements of the law
and intentionally violating them.3 ' A 'knowingly' mens rea is a lesser standard than 'willfully'; if awareness of conduct
can be proven, it is permissible for a jury to infer knowledge on the part of the actor. In attempting to clarify the
distinction between 'knowingly' and higher levels of culpability, the comments to Model Penal Code § 2.02 state that:
"[k]nowledge that the requisite external circumstances exist is a common element in both conceptions.
But action is not purposive with respect to the nature or result of the actor's conduct unless it was his
conscious object to perform an action of that nature or to cause such a result. It is meaningful to think of
the actor's attitude as different if he is simply aware that is conduct is of the required nature or that the
prohibited result is practically certain to follow from his conduct."3 3
22 See generally U.S. v. Hildebrandt, 961 F.2d 116 (8th Cir. 1992).
23 Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 666; U.S. v. Sellers, 926 F.2d 410, 416 n2 (8th Cir. 1991); Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 537;U.S. v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d
1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 1989); U.S. v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1286 (9th Cir. 1993); U.S. v. International Minerals and Chemicals Corp., 402 U.S.
558, 565, 915 S.Ct. 1697, 29 L.Ed. 2d 178 (1971).
24 See Greer, 850 F.2d at 1451; U.S. v. M/G Transport Services, Inc. 173 F.3d 584 (6th Cir 1999); U.S. v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015, (9th Cir. 1998);
U.S. v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (2d Cir. 1997); U.S. v. Self, 2 F.3d 1071 (10th Cir. 1993); U.S. v. Laughlin, 10 F.3d 961 (2d Cir. 1992); U.S. v.
Wagner, 29 F.3d 264 (7th Cir. 1994); U.S. v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533; U.S. v. Hoflin. 880 F.2d 1033; U.S. v. Sinskey, 119 F.3d 712 (8th Cir. 1997);
U.S. v. Buckley, 934 F.2d 84; U.S. v. Kelley Technical Coatings, Inc., 157 F.3d 432 (6th Cir 1998); U.S. v. Baytank, 934 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1991);
U.S. v. Dean, 969 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1992); U.S. v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Company, 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991); U.S. v. Hayes
International, Inc.. 786 F.2d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986); U.S. v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3rd Cir. 1984).
25 Cheek, 498 U.S. at 199.
26 "As pointed out in the preliminary study of the subject for the Brown Commission, the distinction is "between a man who wills that a particular
act or result takes place and another who is merely willing that it should take place." Model Penal Code Comments to §2.02 (1962) quoting I Brown
Commn. Working Papers 124.
27 See U.S. v. Bailey et al., 444 U.S. 394, 100 S. Ct. 624, 62 L.Ed.2d 575, (1980).
28 Id.
29 Bailey, 444 U.S. at 408.
30 Id.
3 LaFave et al., §3.5(b) (West 2d Ed. 1986).
32 Id
3 Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(b) (1962)
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The actor may not care what the result may be of their actions, but may nonetheless be aware that the result is possible.34
A. Controlled Substances
Courts interpret the meaning of the 'knowingly' standard similarly under federal laws dealing with controlled
substances like cocaine. It is common knowledge that drugs like cocaine, crack and heroin are illegal; it is inconceivable
that a person caught in possession of such substance would not be aware of a high probability of government regulation.
Indeed, even as early as 1922, the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Balint found that a person in possession of opium and coca
leaf derivatives has an affirmative duty to determine the applicable law.36
In delineating the parameters of what 'knowingly' means in prosecutions for possession and distribution of
controlled substances, the government is not required to prove that the defendant knew the material to be a controlled
substance. In Marsh, a husband and wife team were convicted of conspiring to manufacture "euphoria," a controlled
substance. Based on evidence showing that they had purchased all of the chemicals necessary and acquired detailed
instructions to the manufacture of the drug, the Court found that jury instructions that did not require the defendants to
know that euphoria was a controlled substance were appropriate. In delineating the government's burden of proof, the
Court stated that:
"The government was not required to prove that the Marshes knew that euphoria was a controlled
substance. In construing criminal statutes, we have often held that one may "knowingly" commit criminal
acts without knowing that the acts are criminal."39
The Sixth Circuit in Decker confirms the holding of Marsh that the government need not prove actual knowledge of a
specific controlled substance.
As can be distilled from the holding in Balint, Marsh and Decker, even in the complicated regulatory structure of
controlled substances, courts applying a 'knowingly' standard merely require that defendants be aware of their actions. As
the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Marrero pointed out in addressing a defendant's argument of a good faith
mistake of law:
"[i]f the defendant's argument were accepted, the exception would swallow the rule. There would be an
infinite number of mistake of law defenses which could be devised from a good-faith, perhaps reasonable
but mistaken, interpretation of criminal statutes, many of which are concededly complex. [Allowing such
arguments] would not serve the ends of justice but rather would serve game playing and evasion from
properly imposed criminal responsibility." 4'
Requiring the government to prove a defendant's subjective awareness of the illegality of their conduct would
fundamentally degrade distinctions among levels of culpability and erode the legitimacy of our judicial system.
B. 'Knowingly' in the Environmental Context
In 1999, it can be fairly said that there is a general awareness in this country of the dangerous nature of hazardous
waste materials, just as there is a general awareness of the dangerous nature of drugs.42 Back in 1987 and 1990, Congress
amended the Clean Water Act, the Resource Recovery and Reclamation Act and the Clean Air Act in response to public
4 id.
3 Black's Law Dictionary defines the term 'Controlled Substance' as: "Any drug so designated by law whose availability is restricted; i.e. so
designated by federal or state Controlled Substances Acts (q.v.) Included in such classification are narcotics, stimulants, depressants. hallucinogens
id marijuana." Black's Law Dictionary 329 (6th ed. 1990).
36 Balini, 258 U.S. at 254.
3 U.S. v. Marsh, 894 F.2d 1035 (9th Cir. 1989); U.S. v. Decker, 19 F.3d 287, 290 (6th Cir. 1994).
" Marsh, 894 F.2d at 1041.
Id. citing United States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 1988).
40 Decker, 19 F.3d at 290.
41 See generally People v. Marrero, 69 N.Y.2d 382, 507 N.E. 2d 1068 (1987)
42 Robert V. Percival et al., Environmental Regulation: Law Science and Policy at 195 (2d ed. 1996).
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pressure to strengthen federal environmental laws.43 In part because no major environmental statute has been enacted or
amended significantly since 1990, corporations that deal with hazardous wastes find that compliance is more or less
routine as they have increasingly relied on in-house counsel and consultants for compliance advice." The 4th Circuit in
Dean found that International Minerals:
"stands for the proposition that persons involved in hazardous waste handling have every reason to be
aware that their activities are regulated by law, aside from the rule that ignorance of the law is no
excuse.',4s
In addition to the above factors there are strong economic incentives for compliance due to substantial enforcement
related penalties; §6928 of RCRA, for example, provides for penalties of up to $25,000 per day in violation." Especially
in a commercial setting, a claim that a responsible person is unaware of the illegality of their actions when handling
hazardous materials rings hollow.47
Basing its decision in part upon U.S. v. Freed, the majority in International Minerals held that ignorance of
regulations regarding hazardous materials is not an excuse." The Court saw "no reason that the word "regulations"
should not be construed as a shorthand designation for specific acts or omissions which violate the Act."49 In elaborating
on the concept, the Court in Sinskey found that:
"In construing other statutes with similar language and structure, that is, statutes in which one provision
punishes the "knowing violation" of another provision that defines the illegal conduct, we have repeatedly
,50held that the word "knowingly" modifies the acts constituting the underlying conduct."
The Sixth Circuit in U.S. v. Dean convicted a defendant of improper disposal under RCRA where he instructed his
employees to dig a forty-foot-long pit behind the plating business he managed, and had hazardous plating waste dumped
directly into the earthen pit- When confronted by investigators about his activities the defendant said that he "had read this
RCRA waste code but thought it was a bunch of bulls... ."5 Even where the materials are not hazardous in nature, if they
are regulated under a statute that does deal with hazardous wastes, like the Clean Water Act, "the government need prove
only that the defendant knew the operative facts which make his action illegal."52 The Second Circuit Court in Hopkins
interpreted Supreme Court precedent in regards to 'knowledge' in the Clean Water Act to mean that:
"[i]n defining the mental state required under a given statute, however, the courts must seek the proper
"inference of the intent of Congress," and in construing knowledge elements that appear in so-called
"pubfic welfare- statutes - i.e. statutes that regulate the use of dangerous or injurious goods or materials -
the Supreme Court has inferred that Congress did not intend to require proof that the defendant knew his
actions were unlawful."53
The Hopkins Court went on to infer that when Congress amended the Clean Water Act in 1987 and reduced the mens rea
requirement from "willfully" to "knowingly," that "Congress intended not to require proof that the defendant knew his
43 S.Rep. No. 50, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 30 (1985), H.R.Conf.Rep.No.1004, 99thCong., 2d Sess. 138 (1986) (both discussing the CWA); Sinskey,
119 F.3d at 716; Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 540; Laughlin, 10 F.3d at 416; Weitzenhoff 35 F.3d at 1283; Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038; Wilson, 133 F.3d at
263; See generally Lois J. Schiffer and James F. Simon, The Reality of Prosecuting Environmental Criminals: A Response to Professor Lazarus, 83
Geo. L.J. 2531, 2535 (1995); Yount supra note 19, at 609.
4 Michael B. Gerrard, Trends in the Supply and Demand for Environmental Lawyers, Presentation before the D.C. Bar Association (July 7,
1999).
4 Dean. 969 F.2d at 192.
46 Resource Recovery and Recovery Act (RCRA) § 6928(d)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. 3008 (1986).
Hoflin. 880 F.2d at 1037; Hayes International, 786 F.2d at 1506-07; Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 541.
48 International Minerals, 402 U.S at 561-62 citing U.S. v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601.
4 Id. at 562.
so Sinskey, 119 F.3d at 715 citing U.S. v. Farrell. 69 F.3d 891-893 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 134 L. Ed. 2d 228, 116 S. Ct. 1283 (1996), and
U.S. v. Hem, 926 F.2d 764, 766-68 (8th Cir, 1991).
s' Dean, 969 F.2d at 189.
52 Wilson, 133 F.3d at 264.
s3 Hopkins 53 F.3d at 537-38 citing Staples, 511 U.S. at 605 (quoting Balint, 258 U.S. at 253), International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 565, U.S. v.
Freed, 410 U.S. 601, 607-08, 28 L. Ed. 2d 356, 91 S.Ct. 1112 (1976), Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280-81.
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conduct violated the law." 54 In 'response to the argument that courts should require the government to prove knowledge of
illegality, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "[ijfiwe construe the word "knowingly" as requiring that the.
defendant must appreciate the illegality of.his acts, we obliterate its distinction from the willfulness." The Sixth Circuit
recently found in regards to the "knowledge of illegality" argument that it "has also been.rejected.by every.other court of
appeals that has considered the issue."56
Consistent with. the idea that a person need notknow whether a chemical is a controlled substance, courts have
not required knowledge of whether the material is a EPA listed hazardous waste.57. Every court that has considered the
'listed waste' issue has found that such specific knowledge is not required.58 The rationale for imposing criminal liability
is that since these laws attempt to safeguard the "public welfare," where a person is dealing with an "obnoxious" material,
it permissible for a jury to infer that the actor knows that her or his activity is regulated. 9 In assessing allowable
inferences about what a person who runs a business should know about RCRA, the 11th Circuit in Hayes International
found that:
"section 6928(d)(1). is undeniably a public welfare statute, involving a heavily regulated area with great
ramifications for public health and safety. As the Supreme Court has explained, it is completely fair and
reasonable to charge those who choose to operate in such areas with knowledge of regulatory
provisions.'
Therefore, especially where a person is involved in the day-to-day operation of a business that generates hazardous waste,
it is consistent with due process to allow a jury to infer notice and charge such a person with the responsibility to
determine how to comply with regulations.
If courts were to require that a person knew that they were handling a hazardous waste, they would be, in effect,
raising the level of mens rea to close to a "willfully" level; this outcome is clearly not supported by the language of the
statute and goes against the clear intent of Congress to make environmental crimes easier to prosecute. The 5 Circuit
Court of Appeals in Baytank found that:
"the statute -- § 6928(d)(2)(A) -- does use the word "knowingly," but we conclude, as Dee, Hoflin, and
Hayes International all indicate, that "knowingly" means no more than that the defendant knows factually
what he is doing ... and it is not required that he know that there is a regulation which says that what he is
storing is hazardous under the RCRA."
While courts have consistently found that a person is not required to know if the material is a listed hazardous waste,
courts have differed over whether a 9erson has to be aware of a mere potential for harm to human health or environment
or a "substantial" potential to do so.
Beginning with the Supreme Court in International Minerals, the majority of circuit courts have required the
government to prove that the defendant know the general hazardous nature of the substance under their control.65 Some
54 Id. at 540.
ss Wilson, 133 F.3d at 262.
56 Kelley Technical Coatings, 157 F.3d at 436-37 citing Dean, 969 F.2d at 191; Self 2 F.3d at 1089-9 1; U.S. v. Goldsmith, 978 F.2d 643. 645
(11th Cir. 1992); Baytank, 934 F.2d at 613; Dee, 912 F.2d at 745; Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1037-39; Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 669.
5 Buckley, 934 F.2d at 88; Laughlin, 10 F.3d at 965; Sellers, 926 F.2d at 417; Self 2 F.3d at 1090; Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 538; Hayes International,
933 F.2d at 1503-04; Dee, 912 F.2d at 745; Baytank, 934 F.2d at 612; but see Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 669 (while the Court did not hold that a
defendant must specifically know that a material is "listed" by the EPA, it did require that the defendant know that the waste was "hazardous" which
infers a different kind of knowledge than of a "substantial potential" for harm.)
5 Id.
s9 International Minerals at 565; Buckley, 934 F.2d at 88; Laughlin, 10 F.3d at 965; Sellers, 926 F.2d at 417; Self 2 F.3d at 1090; Hopkins, 53
F.3d at 538; Hayes International, 933 F.2d at 1503-04; Dee, 912 F.2d at 745; Baytank, 934 F.2d at 612; but see Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668-
69.
60 Hayes International, 786 F.2d at 1503.
6' Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1037; Hayes International, 786 F.2d at 1506-07; Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 541.
62 Schiffer, supra note 43, at 2535; U.S. v. Laughlin, 10 F.3d 961; Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 540; Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038; Weitzenhof, 35 F.3d at
1283; Sinskey, 119 F.3d at 716.
63 Baytank, 934 F.2d at 613.
6 Laughlin, 10 F.3d at 967; Sellers, 926 F.2d at 417; Iverson, 162 F.3d at 1027; Hopkins. 53 F.3d at 538; Hayes International, 933 F.2d at 1502;
Dee, 912 F.2d at 745; Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1039; Kelley Technical Coatings, 157 F.3d at 441; Greer, 850 F.2d at 1452.
6 Id.
6
MELPR, Vol. 8, No. I
circuit courts have held that the preferable standard would be to require evidence that the defendant had knowledge of
"substantial" potential to harm human health and the environment.
Section 6903(5) of RCRA reads:
"The term "hazardous waste" means a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which because of its
quantity, concentration or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may --(B) pose a substantial
present or potential hazard to human health or the environment., 67
Some courts have interpreted this language to only require knowledge that the materials involved were not benign like
68water. Other courts have found that requiring a defendant to know more than just a "potential" was a preferable jury
instruction.69 Indeed, the court in U.S. v. Laughlin found that, while not reversible error, a jury instruction that only
required knowledge of a "potential" harm was insufficient and that the instruction should have required the jury to find a
"substantial potential" for harm to human health and the environment. 70 The Laughlin court reasoned that it would be
more consistent with the statutory language to require knowledge of a "substantial potential." In U.S. v. Sellers, the
defendant was convicted of disposing of hazardous waste without a permit when he dumped sixteen 55-gallon drums of
paint and solvent wastes on the side of a creek in rural Mississippi.71 In contrast to Laughlin, the Sellers Court rejected a
claim of plain error where no instructions were given on this element at the trial level, holding that the jury merely should
have been instructed that there was a potential harm to human health and environment:
"It is clear that paint and paint solvent waste, by its very nature, is potentially dangerous to the
environment and to persons. Thus it should have come as no surprise that the disposal of that waste is
regulated. The evidence presented at trial established that Sellers knew that the waste he was disposing
included M.E.K., [Methyl Ethyl Ketone], a paint solvent, and that this substance was extremely
flammable. There can be no doubt that Sellers knew that the substance he was disposing was potentially
dangerous to human beings and the environment and that regulations, therefore, would exist governing
the manner of its disposal."72
Where a defendant is knowledgeable about RCRA requirements, signs annual hazardous waste registration forms and
arranged for legal disposal of hazardous waste in the past, it is proper to infer that they know that the material has the
potential to cause harm. In light of Congressional intent,74 the remedial nature of public welfare and environmental
statutes75 and the fact that the people making decisions about how to handle obnoxious materials know what they're
76doing, courts should only require that defendants be proven aware of the "potential" for harm to human health and
environment.
II. STRICT LIABILITY
Critics argue that the mental state requirements in public welfare environmental statutes are akin to strict liability;
violations of such statutes have traditionally been, and should be, punished as misdemeanors and not felonies, so the
argument goes. This conception is a fundamental misunderstanding of criminal provisions in environmental laws due to
the inherently subjective nature of a "knowingly" mens rea requirement. Strict liability crimes do not require any
6 Laughlin, 10 F.3d at 967; Kelley Technical Coatings, 157 F.3d at 441.
67 42 U.S.C. §6903(5) and (5)(B).
68 Sellers, 926 F.2d at 417; Iverson, 162 F.3d at 1027; Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1039; Self 2 F.3d at 1091; Dee, 912 F.2d at 745.
69 Laughlin, 10 F.3d at 967; Baytank, 934 F.2d at 612; Kelley Technical Coatings, 157 F.3d at 441.
70 Laughlin, 10 F.3d at 967.
n1 Sellers, 926 F.2d at 412.
72 Id. at 417.
7 Kelley Technical Coatings, 157 F.3d at 441.
7 Congress stated that it had "not sought to define 'knowing' for offenses under [§6928 of RCRA] subsection (d); that process has been left to the
courts under general principles" Hayes International, 933 F.2d at 1502 quoting S.Rep. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1980), U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin.News 1980, pp.5019, 5038.
7 Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 666; Sellers, 926 F.2d at 416 n.2; Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 537; Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038; Weitzenhoff 35 F.3d at
1286.
76 Self 2 F.3d at 1088; Greer, 850 F.2d at 1451-52; Kelley Technical Coatings, 157 F.3d at 437.
n Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668; Sinskey, 119 F.3d at 717; Dean, 969 F.2d at 192; See Bruce R. Bryan, The Battle Between Mens Rea and
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subjective culpability or awareness of conduct;78 while the mental state requirements were lowered from "willfully" to
"knowingly," this change does not eliminate a requirement of mens rea.9 The Eighth Circuit in Sinskey aptly noted that:
"requiring the government to prove only that the defendant acted with awareness of his or her conduct does not render [a
criminal provision] a strict liability offense."80
Strict liability crimes were not favored at common law, but were primarily created by legislatures that wrote
statutes to "simply provide that whoever does (or omits to do) so-and-so, or whoever brings about such-and-such a result,
is guilty of a crime, setting forth the punishment."8' Such is the case with statutory rape statutes. Due to the seriousness of
the crime, Legislatures wrote laws that irresfective of the subjective intent of the actor, he (or she) would be guilty of an
offense with significant criminal penalties. 8
As is discussed above, the "knowingly" mens rea in criminal provisions of environmental statutes require proof
that a defendant knew he or she was disposing of dangerous wastes in an unsafe manner. While some subsections of
environmental criminal provisions arguably contain some strict liability elements, the knowledge mens rea requirement
for most offenses is inherently subjective and not properly characterized as strict liability.
A. Mistake of Fact
Allowing for a mistake of fact defense in public welfare cases adds another layer of subjectivity in finding a
knowing violation.84 Courts allow for a mistake of fact defense where the possessor honestly does not know what the
85material in their possession was. If a person honestly does not know what they possess or is unaware of its "noxious"
qualities, the inference of knowledge and notice in this instance would not be appropriate.86
The Supreme Court in International Minerals stated that "[p]encils, dental floss, [and] paper clips may also be
regulated," but since these Froducts were not 'obnoxious,' they would raise concern about due process if there were not a
requirement of a mens rea. The Court was concerned about the potential overbreadth of the public welfare doctrine for
88the situations where there would be no notice sufficient to infer culpability. Indeed, the Model Penal Code states that
where a mistake of fact "negatives the ... knowledge ... required to establish a material element of the offense," such
mistake constitutes a valid defense.89 These propositions are based upon the fundamental concept in criminal law that
requires both an illegal action and a culpable mind."
In this vein, several courts have discussed situations where such a defense would be appropriate.91 The 1 1t Circuit
in Hayes International presents an interesting variation on the traditional mistake of fact defense. In Hayes International,
the defendant was convicted for knowingly transporting hazardous waste to a facility that did not have a proper permit.92
The defendant entered an agreement with another party that would accept the defendants wastes, a mixture of paints and
solvents generated from refurbishing airplanes, and recover valuable materials therefrom.93 The court found that, in
principle, where the defendant reasonably believed the materials were being recycled, they would be able to make a valid
mistake of fact defense.94
the Public Welfare: United States v. Laughlin Finds a Middle Ground, 6 Fordham Envtl. Law J. 157 (1995); LaFave et al., Criminal Law, §3.8 at 242
(West 2d Ed. 1986).
78 LaFave et al., Criminal Law, §3.8 at 242-43 (West 2d Ed. 1986).
79 The 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals in Hopkins found that another "way of heightening sanctions is to reduce the mens rea element of the
prohibited acts, and a change from prohibiting "willful" acts to prohibiting "knowing" acts may be viewed as such a reduction." Hopkins, 53 F.3d at
539.
s Sinskey, 119 F.3d at 717.
81 LaFave et al., Criminal Law, §3.8 at 242-43 (West 2d Ed. 1986).82 Id at 245, n. 16.
83 LaFave et al., Criminal Law, §3.8 at 243 (2d ed West 1986).
8 See Schiffer, supra note 43, 2535; Id.
85 International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 564; U.S. v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386, 391 (5th Cir. 1996); Staples, 511 U.S. at 607; Self. 2 F.3d at 1091:
Bryan, supra note 77, at 191.
Id.
8 International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 564.
88 Id.
89 Model Penal Code § 2.04(l)(a) (1962).
9 LaFave et al., Criminal Law, § 1.2(b) at 8 (West 2d Ed. 1986); Model Penal Code § 2.01(1) (1962)
91 International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 564; Ahnad. 101 F.3d at 391; Staples, 511 U.S. at 607; Self, 2 F.3d at 1091.
92 Hayes International, 786 F.2d at 1500.
9 See Id. at 1506.
9 See Id. at 1505, (However, the court found sufficient evidence that the defendant knew that the wastes were in fact not being recycled).
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Similarly, the 4' Circuit in Wilson found that if a defendant believed his activity, (here, filling in wetlands), to be
sanctioned based upon an incorrect permit, the court would also allow a mistake of fact defense.9 ' In Wilson, a developer
was charged for knowingly violating the Clean Water Act where he discharged fill into wetlands without obtaining the
correct permit.96 By allowing a defense on the basis of a lack of knowledge of the essential facts, courts impliedly requin
a heightened level of culpability for environmental criminal offenses.97 This conclusion weighs directly against
characterizing violations of public welfare statutes as strict liability offenses.98
B. Permit Requirement
In contrast with other parts of environmental criminal provisions, the elements that require a person to have a
permit to dispose of or otherwise handle waste is akin to strict liability. 99 Major environmental laws that have provisions
requiring a permit of some kind do not have the word "knowingly" in the same phrase.'" The vast majority of circuit
courts hold that proof of knowledge of the need for a permit or knowledge of its breach is not necessary to find a violation
of the permit requirement.101
The Third Circuit in Johnson & Towers, the dissent in Weitzenhoff and some commentators argue that despite the
absence of an explicit mens rea requirement for the existence of and violation of a permit, at least a knowingly mens rea
requirement should be inferred. 0 2 The Court in Johnson & Towers in a RCRA context found that where the knowingly
mens rea was present in the other subsections of §6928(d), that it would be "arbitrary and nonsensical" not to require
culpability for the permit requirement.' 03 This interpretation has been rejected by every other court of appeals that has
considered it.1
04
In what has been called "the most analytically robust" argument for the imposition of a mental state to the permit
requirement, the dissent in Weitzenhoff asserts that where a person did not know that they had actually violated their
effluent permit limit, they didn't knowingly commit such an offense.1os The defendants in the Weitzenhoff case were
sanitary workers who bypassed the normal processing procedure in discharging raw sewage into Hawaii's oceans; by
doing so, they circumvented a monitoring device in order to hide evidence of violations of the facility's discharge
permit. 0 6 Judge Kleinfeld's dissent made much of the fact that the permit was only exceeded by 6%; moreover, the
dissent argues, by treating the permit requirement as akin to strict liability, the majority opinion captures much innocent
conduct and makes it criminal.'o7 This argument is internally inconsistent. The existence of a permit necessarily imputes
some level of subjective knowledge of a limit for discharging since the permit is tailored specifically to that facility.os
The culpability the dissent argues is lacking is directly undermined by the fact by the defendant's knowledge of the
existence of the permit in the first place and the fact that the defendants conduct was consciously directed at evading the
responsibilities under the permit. Admittedly, however, the minimal subjectivity generated by the permit does not rise to
the level of culpability of other elements.
The rationale for interpreting criminal provisions so as to virtually dispense with a mens rea element is based on a
reading of the language of the sections,"o9 Congressional policy choiceso and the weight of judicial interpretation."
9 Wilson, 133 F.3d at 264.
96 See Id. at 251.
9 See Schiffer, supra note 43, at 2535; International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 564; Ahmad, 101 F.3d at 391; Staples, 511 U.S. at 607; Self, 2 F.3d at
1091.
98 Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668; Sinskey, 119 F.3d at 717; Dean, 969 F.2d at 192; See Bryan, supra note 77; LaFave et al., Criminal Law
§3.5(b) at 218-220 (West 2d Ed. 1986).
9 See Weitzenhoff 35 F.3d at 1296, (Kleinfeld dissenting); Resource Recovery and Recovery Act (RCRA) § 6928(d)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. 3008
(1986); Clean Water Act (CWA) § 1319 (c)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. 309 (1987); Clean Air Act § 7413 (c)(1)(C), 42 U.S.C. 113 (1990).
l00 Id.
'' Laughlin, 10 F.3d at 966; Hopkins. 53 F.3d at 538-40, 544; Haves International, 786 F.2d at 1503-04; Dean, 969 F.2d at 191; Hoflin, 880 F.2d
at 1037; Weiizenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1286; Kelley Technical Coatings, 157 F.3d at 437; U.S. v. Wagner, 29 F.3d 264, 266 (7th Cir. 1994); Sinskey, 119
F.3d at 715 but see Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 670 (knowledge applies to all elements; this is the only court to so hold.)
102 Johnson & Towers. 741 F.2d at 670; Weitzenhoff, (Kleinfeld dissenting), 35 F.3d at 1296; See Yount, supra note 19, at 609.
103 Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668.
104 Dee, 912 F.2d at 744-45; Hopkins. 53 F.3d at 537; Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1036-37; Hayes International, 786 F.2d at 1503-4; Buckley, 934 F.2d at
88.
105 Yount supra note 19, at 618.
106 Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1281-82.
'o Id. at 1296.
o LaFave et al., Criminal Law, §3.8 at 242 (West 2d Ed. 1986).
10 Resource Recovery and Recovery Act (RCRA) § 6928(d)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. 3008 (1986); Clean Water Act (CWA) § 1319 (c)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C.
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Section 6928(d) of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act provides, in pertinent part:
Any person who--
(2) knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste
identified or listed under this subtitle--
(A) without a permit under this subtitle...;
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of such permit; or
(C) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of any applicable interim status
regulations or standards
shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not more than $25,000 ... or to imprisonment not to exceed one year
... or both. 42 U.S.C. § 6928.
A close reading of § 6928(d) provides that there are some sub-sections that contain culpability elements and some
that do not; the subsection that deals with the permit requirement clearly does not delineate a mental state. The Ninth
Circuit in Hoflin found that:
"The absence of the word "knowing" in subsection (A) is in stark contrast to its presence in the
immediately following subsection (B). The statute makes a clear distinction between non-permit holders
and permit holders, requiring in subsection (B) that the latter knowingly violate a material condition or
requirement of the permit. To read the word "knowingly" at the beginning of section (2) into subsection(A) would be to eviscerate this distinction. Thus, it is plain that knowledge of the absence of a permit is
not an element of the offense defined in subsection (A)." Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1037.
Based upon the idea that "interpretive constructions [of statutes] which would render some of the words surplusage ... are
to be avoided," since Congress decided to omit the word "knowingly" from sections regarding permits, Congress did not
intend a mental state to apply to them." 2 The language Congress chose evidences an intent to make criminal enforcement
more effective; indeed, the Second Circuit decision in Hopkins stands for the proposition that decreasing a mens rea
requirement is a means for heightening enforcement.' The Hoflin Court notes that by eliminating the mens rea
requirement:
"[t]hose who handle such waste are, therefore, affirmatively required to provide information to the EPA
in order to secure permits. Placing this burden on those handling hazardous waste materials makes it
possible for the EPA to know who is handling hazardous waste, and enforce compliance with the statute.
On the other hand, persons who handle hazardous waste materials without telling the EPA what they are
doing shield their activity from the eyes of the regulatory agency and thus inhibit the agency from
performing its assigned tasks."ll 4
It has become a settled proposition in the vast majority of circuit courts that proof of knowledge of the permit requirement
is not necessary.
Even if it is granted that theypermit requirement is a strict liability offense, Congress is empowered to protect the
public welfare through legislation." LaFave and Scott note that: "[o]ther things being equal, the more serious the
309 (1987); Clean Air Act § 7413 (c)(1)(C), 42 U.S.C. 113 (1990).
10 S.Rep. No. 50, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 30 (1985), H.R.Conf.Rep.No.1004, 99thCong., 2d Sess. 138 (1986) (both discussing the CWA); See S.Rep.No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1980), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 1980, pp.50 19 (RCRA).
Laughlin, 10 F.3d at 966; Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 538-40, 544; Hayes International, 786 F.2d at 1503-04; Dean, 969 F.2d at 191; Hoflin, 880 F.2d
at 1037; Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1286; Kelley Technical Coatings, 157 F.3d at 437; Wagner, 29 F.3d at 266; Sinskey, 119 F.3d at 715 but see Johnson& Towers, 741 F.2d at 670.112 Laughlin, 10 F.3d at 966; Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 537-38; Dean, 969 F.2d at 191; Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1286; Kelley Technical Coatings, 157F.3d at 437; Wagner, 29 F.3d at 266.
"' Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 539.
114 Hoflin, 80 F.2d at 1038-39.
"' Laughlin, 10 F.3d at 966; Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 538-40, 544; Hayes International, 786 F.2d at 1503-04; Dean, 969 F.2d at 191; Hoflin, 880 F.2d
at 1037; Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1286; Kelley Technical Coatings, 157 F.3d at 437; Wagner, 29 F.3d at 266; Sinskey, 119 F.3d at 715.116 Balint, 258 U.S. at 254, ("Congress weighed the possible injustice of subjecting an innocent seller to a penalty against the evil of exposinginnocent purchasers to danger..., and concluded that the latter was the result preferably to be avoided.")
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consequences to the public, the more likely the legislature meant to impose liability without regard to fault.""' Public
welfare statutes originated out of a concern of the general public that individuals cannot adequately protect themselves
from the perils of the industrial revolution." 8 Congress made a choice to help protect the public at large by enacting
statutes that provide more powerful tools to aid government enforcement in deterring potentially dangerous activities.11
Early "public welfare" statutes created misdemeanor offenses with lower mental state requirements where the
individual or corporation dealt with a product that could adversely affect public health. 120 These lower mental state
requirements placed a greater burden on those who dealt with such products to seek out the necessary obligations to
comply with applicable laws.'"' Crimes that require a low or non-existent mental state necessarily raise constitutional
questions about due process. 22 Where the penalty is lower, the mental state is also low; when the penalty is more severe,
due process requires a higher mental state that incorporates the concept of notice.
What inherently differentiates public welfare statutes is the nature of the material that is being regulated. Things
like radioactive waste are likely to put its possessor on notice of regulation whereas things like food stamps are not. 124
Where a material is sufficiently "obnoxious," courts are willing to allow the jury to infer notice of the potential for
regulation on the part of its possessor.12 5 The Supreme Court in U.S. v. Balint found that such an inference is justifiable
since Congress weighed notice concerns with the concern for public health and found the latter more persuasive. The
Court found that where the defendant was in possession of illegal drugs like opium, it was incumbent on them to
determine how to comply with the law. 126
The distinction in public welfare statutes is that there is a permissible inference of notice with "obnoxious"
materials; at least one commentator characterizes the mens rea of such statutes as a hybrid between a "negligence" and a
"knowingly" standard.127 Inherent within this "hybrid" characterization is the recognition of a subjective element
inconsistent with strict liability; one has to "know" what one possesses.128 A true strict liability standard would not
distinguish based upon knowledge of potential illegality;129 since public welfare statutes contain and require a mens rea
element, they are distinguishable from pure strict liability crimes.
III. RULE OF LENITY
Some courts and commentators argue that environmental statutes and the regulations that interpret them are
"notoriously ambiguous."l30 Several commentators argue, and a small minority of courts have held, that the rule of lenity
should apply to environmental criminal provisions due to their ambiguity.' 3 ' A statute is ambiguous when it is unclear
how it will be applied in a particular case.1 32 The rule of lenity serves to resolve any ambiguity in a particular statute in
favor of the defendant.' 33 In emphasizing the need to construe a statute narrowly where it is ambiguous, the Plaza court
quotes Justice Douglas from an opinion involving a prosecution under the Rivers and Harbors Act:
117 LaFave et al., Criminal Law, §3.8(b) at 244 (2d Ed West 1986).
118 See Morrissette v. U.S., 342 U.S. 246, 72 S. Ct. 240, 96 L. Ed. 288 (1952).
Il9 Balint, 258 U.S. at 254; See U.S. v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 64 S. Ct. 134, 88 L. Ed. 48 (1943); Morrissette v. U.S. 342 U.S. 246, 72 S. Ct.
240, 96 L. Ed. 288 (1952); U.S. v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 95 S. Ct. 1903, 44 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1975); International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 565.120 See Id.
121 See Id.; Johnson at 666; Sellers, 926 F.2d at 416, n. 2; Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 537; Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038; Weitzenhoff 35 F.3d at 1286.
22 Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426; Staples, 511 U.S at 604-05.123 See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957); Yount, supra note 19, at 617.
124 Liparota, 471 U.S. at 432-33.
International Minerals at 565; Buckley, 934 F.2d at 88; Laughlin, 10 F.3d at 965; Sellers, 926 F.2d at 417; Self 2 F.3d at 1090; Hopkins, 53 F.3d
at 538; Hayes International, 933 F.2d at 1503-04; Dee, 912 F.2d at 745; Baytank, 934 F.2d at 612; but see Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668-69.
126 Balint, 258 U.S. at 254.
127 Bryan, supra note 77, at 177 n. 115.
128 International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 565: Buckley, 934 F.2d at 88; Laughlin, 10 F.3d at 965; Sellers, 926 F.2d at 417; Self, 2 F.3d at 1090;
Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 538; Hayes International, 786 F.2d at 1503-04; Dee, 912 F.2d at 745; Baytank, 934 F.2d at 612; but see Johnson & Towers, 741
F.2d at 668-69.
129 LaFave et al., Criminal Law, §3.8 at 242 (West 2d Ed. 1986).130 Weitzenhoff 35 F.3d at 1283; Yount, supra note 19, at 620 citing Brickey, supra note 155, at 14; Richard Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of
Integration in the Evolution of Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 Georgetown L. . 2407, 2431 (1995).
'3' Yount supra note 19, at 618; Weittenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1295-96 (Kleinfeld dissenting); U.S. v. Plaza Health Laboratories, 3 F.3d 643, 646; U.S. v.
Borowski, 977 F.2d 27, 31-32 cited in Yount supra note 19, at 618.
132 Plaza, 3 F.3d at 646.
133 Yount supra note 19, at 612-613.
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"This case comes to us at a time in the Nation's history when there is greater concern than ever over
pollution -one of the main threats to our free-flowing rivers and to our lakes as well. The crisis we face in
this respect would not, of course, warrant us in manufacturing offenses where Congress has not acted nor
in stretching statutory language in a criminal field to meet strange conditions."'34
The purpose of narrowly construing criminal statutes is that, if ambiguous, a person would not have adequate warning that
his or her conduct is deemed illegal. 1Another purpose of the rule of lenity is to force Congress to work out the details of
criminal sanctions in the legislative process instead of delegating interpretive responsibility to the courts. 36 The dissent in
Weitzenhoff reflects this sentiment and adds that the rule of lenity is especially appropriate when dealing with public
welfare statutes due to the lower requirements for showing culpability and the broad range of activity covered by the
Clean Water Act. 37
But since public welfare statutes still require substantial proof of the culpability of the defendant, such arguments
are unfounded. The Court in Plaza held that it would be appropriate to apply the rule of lenity only after considering the
language and structure of the act itself, legislative history, judicial interpretations and "interpretive statements by the
agency in charge of implementing the statute. In that case the Court was attempting to discern the application of the
definition of the term "point source" as it related to an individual who, by his own hands, placed contaminated blood vials
next to a bulkhead where the vials were subsequently taken out to sea.' 39 The Court explained that:
"[wie find no suggestion either in the act itself or in the history of its passage that congress intended the
CWA to impose criminal liability on an individual for the myriad, random acts of human waste disposal,
for example, a passerby who flings a candy wrapper into the Hudson River, or a urinating swimmer.
Discussions during the passage of the 1972 amendments indicate that congress had bigger fish to fry."
Therefore, the Court held that since the term was ambiguous as applied to the defendant, it would be appropriate to apply
the rule of lenity despite what the Court had characterized as "such an obviously wrong act."' 41 However, Plaza merely
stands for use of the rule of lenity for definitional aspects of crimes; by contrast, there is nothing ambiguous about the
mental state requirements. The above rationale from Plaza is also significantly limited due to its interpretation of ajurisdictional element that arguably does not require proof of mens rea.
The Supreme Court recently held that the rule of lenity only applies when there is "grievous ambiguity or
uncertainty in the statute" and when "after seizing everything from which aid can be derived, we can make no more than a
guess as to what Congress intended."42 The ambiguity that is the essence of the argument for the rule of lenity can be
clarified by analyzing the language of the statute and determining the intent of Congress. 143 As I've shown in Section II,
the knowledge requirement is not ambiguous, therefore application of the rule of lenity is inappropriate.
IV. PROPRIETY OF FELONY LEVEL PENALTIES
Some courts and commentators argue that since violations of environmental criminal provisions constitute
felonies, the absence of a culpability requirement is improper.'1" In critiquing the application of the public welfare
doctrine to felony level crimes, proponents point out that the original penalties contemplated by the doctrine were only
misdemeanors. Due to the absence of a mens rea in the statutes there is an implied duty on behalf of those dealing in
such obnoxious materials to seek out their obligation to comply with the applicable laws." 6 In construing the justification
'4 U.S. v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 225, 86 S.Ct 1427, 1428 16 L.Ed.2d 492 (1966) cited in Plaza, 3 F.3d at 650.
' Liparota, 471 U.S. at 427 cited in Bryan supra note 77, at 172; Yount supra note 19, at 617.136 Plaza, 3 F.3d at 649; Id.
Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1295-96 (Kleinfeld dissenting).
' Plaza, 3 F.3d at 646.
139 id.
140 Id.
141 Plaza, 3. F.3d at 649.
142 Muscarello v. U.S., 524 U.S. 125, 141 L. Ed. 2d 111, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1919 (1998) quoted in Iverson, 162 F.3d at 1025. n. 8.
' Dean, 969 F.2d at 191; Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1037; Plaza, 3 F.3d at 646; Weitzenhoff 35 F.3d at 1283.
'4 See generally Yount supra note 19 at 609; Lazarus, supra note 43 at 2431; See Bryan supra note 77: AhImad, 101 F.3d at 391; Weitzenhoff 35.
F.3d at 1298-99 (Kleinfeld dissenting).
145 Ahmad, 101 F.3d at 391; Weitzenhoff 35 F.3d at 1298-99 (Kleinfeld dissenting);Yount supra note 19, at 609; Lazarus supra note 43 at 2431.
'4 Balint, 258 U.S. at 254; Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280.
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for lowered culpability requirements in "public welfare" offenses, the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Park, explained that:
"Dotterweich and the cases which have followed reveal that in providing sanctions which reach and touch
the individuals that execute the corporate mission... the Act imposes not only a positive duty to seek out
and remedy violations when they occur but also, and primarily, a duty to implement measures that will
insure that violations will not occur. The requirements of foresight and vigilance imposed on responsible
corporate agents are beyond question demanding, and perhaps onerous, but they are no more stringent
than the public has a right to expect of those who voluntarily assume positions of authority in business
enterprises whose services affect the health and well-being of the public that supports them."' 4 7
As public sentiment grew regarding the seriousness of environmental issues, so did interest in making penalties more
severe. In contrast to older fashioned public welfare statutes, contemporary environmental statutes provide for felony
level penalties for knowing violations.149
Some commentators argue that the line of Supreme Court cases marked by Liparota and Staples hold that public
welfare statutes in general do not allow for felony level penalties. 50 The Supreme Court found in Liparota v. U.S. that
where a statute did not have a mental state delineated within the applicable section, it would be improper to find a person
guilty of a felony offense. All courts that addressed Liparota before the decision in Staples was handed down held that
such reasoning was inapplicable in the environmental context; food stamps, unlike hazardous waste, do not have the
"obnoxious" characteristics that would ostensibly put their possessors on notice of the potential for regulation.'
Some courts and commentators have argued that the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Staples took the
Liparota reasoning further to severely limit the scope of liability for public welfare offenses.152 In Staples the Supreme
Court considered a law that prohibited the manufacture of, or conversion to, a fully automatic machine gun; the court went
on to find that guns are not the kind of article that would necessarily make a person aware of the potential for
regulation. Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, cited a long tradition of gun ownership in America, all of which
occurred in a non-commercial setting. 5 4 Commentators rely on Staples to argue that if fully automatic machine guns are
not enough to put a person sufficiently on notice of the potential for regulation, neither is hazardous waste. 5 5 Therefore,
some would argue, it would be improper for a jury to hold a person liable merely for his or her unlawful disposal of a
hazardous material since there might be insufficient notice to permissibly infer knowledge on behalf of its possessor. 5 6
Since there is arguably insufficient notice, this would make environmental statutes too much like strict liability offenses,
and would therefore make the application of felony level penalties inappropriate.157
Although Staples would seem to mandate such a conclusion, the Court backed off going all the way to outlawing
felony public welfare offenses.'ss As is pointed out in Weitzenhoff and confirmed in Hopkins, the Staples court
acknowledged that earlier cases suggest that public welfare offenses might not extend to felonies, yet noted that "we need
not adopt such a definitive rule of construction to decide this case."'59 This leaves open the possibility for enhanced
penalties for public welfare legislation.
In addition to the unwillingness in Staples to rule out felony penalties, there are several reasons that the
proponents of the above interpretation of Liparota and Staples to curtail the public welfare doctrine are wrong. While
perhaps in 1994, or by taking a purely historic approach to viewing gun use in America, one could come to the conclusion
that something like a machine gun would not alert a person to the potential for regulation; a look at recent events in this
country proves enlightening. The dangerousness of guns in the past year alone is demonstrated not only in "traditional
problem areas," but also with the traumatic hemorrhage of events at Columbine High School in Colorado and other school
"4 Park, 421 U.S. at 673.
148 Robert V. Percival et al., Environmental Regulation: Law Science and Policy at 195 (2d ed. 1996).
'4 Resource Recovery and Recovery Act (RCRA) § 6928(d)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. 3008 (1986); Clean Water Act (CWA) § 1319 (c)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C.309 (1987); Clean Air Act § 7413 (c)(1)(C), 42 U.S.C. 113 (1990).
1so Yount supra note 19, at 609; Lazarus supra note 43 at 2431; See Bryan supra note 77.
"s' Self 2 F.3d at 1090: Hayes International, 933 F.2d at 1502.
152 Yount supra note 19, at 609; See Bryan supra note 77: Ahmad, 101 F.3d at 391; Weitzenhoff 35 F.3d at 1298-99 (Kleinfeld dissenting).
' Staples, 511 U.S. at 611.
154 Id.
11s Ahmad. 101 F.3d at 391.
156 Id.;Yount supra note 19, at 609; See Bryan supra note 77; Weitzenhoff 35 F.3d at 1298-99 (Kleinfeld dissenting).
1 Id.
5s Staples, 511 U.S. at 618-19.
59 Id. cited in Weitzenhoff 35 F.3d at 1286; Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 540.
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shootings by young people that made even the NRA consider canceling its annual meeting. Although there may have been
only a limited legislative response, it would be unrealistic to find that the average person would not be put on notice of
possible regulation when in possession of a machine gun.
Secondly, guns and hazardous wastes are very different in the nature of their composition and patterns of use.
Few would likely argue that hazardous waste has a long tradition of lawful use in this country that wouldn't necessarily
place its possessor on notice of regulation. Indeed, what the Staples court was trying to protect was the individual gun
owner in a primarily non-commercial setting. For the most part, obnoxious materials are not utilized by individuals in a
non-commercial setting. In contrast to the general nature of gun use, such materials are usually generated in a commercial
context and are generally considered a liability, not a treasured tradition exemplifying American values.160
Hazardous waste, by its smell, appearance, and reactive properties is a substance that inherently should generate
caution in its possessor.1' This is especially true in light of the increased public awareness and concern over
environmental degradation; 6 2 this same concern prompted Congress to amend and toughen the criminal provisions of
many federal environmental laws.' 63 Therefore, since Congress can be assumed to be aware of the continued vitality of the
public welfare doctrine when it amended legislation, they were presumably aware of the consequences of lowering the
mental state and increasing penalties. While Congress did not explicitly address the felony/misdemeanor issue, the
wording of the statutes show a consistent and conscious choice not to require a mens rea for some elements despite their
strict liability nature.'6 The great majority of Circuits that have considered both the strict liability and Liparota-Staples
thread have found them not to apply in the context of environmental public welfare legislation.165
V. WHO'S RESPONSIBLE? CONCEPTS OF IMPLIED AND ASSUMED KNOWLEDGE
The purpose of the criminal provisions of environmental laws is to have the greatest deterrent effect with limited
prosecutorial resources.'6 The means for achieving this end is to prosecute the people in higher positions within a
business entity who seek to insulate themselves from criminal liability by using subordinates to do the "dirty" work. 67 In
targeting those making the decisions, courts have utilized the "Willful Blindness"'68 and "Responsible Corporate
Officer"'69 doctrines as a way to demonstrate culpability where direct evidence is weaker. Using circumstantial evidence
via the above doctrines does not lower the level of awareness needed to be proven at trial so as to make the mens rea akin
to strict liability; they merely provide an alternate means of amassing evidence to prove a count.170
A. Willful Blindness
The Willful Blindness doctrine is a means to prove knowledge "'where it can almost be said that the defendant
actually knew,' as when a person "has his suspicion aroused but then deliberately omits to make further inquiries, because
'6 Staples, 511 U.S. at 611.
161 Sellers, 926 F.2d at 417; Iverson, 162 F.3d at 1027; Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1039; Self 2 F.3d at 1091; Dee, 912 F.2d at 745: Laughlin, 10 F.3d at
967; Baytank, 934 F.2d at 612; Kelley Technical Coatings, 157 F.3d at 441.
162 Robert V. Percival et al., Environmental Regulation: Law Science and Policy at 195 (2d ed. 1996).163 S.Rep. No. 50, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 30 (1985), H.R.Conf.Rep.No. 1004, 99thCong., 2d Sess. 138 (1986) (both discussing the CWA): Sinskey,
119 F.3d at 716; Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 540; Laughlin, 10 F.3d at 416; Weitzenhoff 35 F.3d at 1283; Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038; Wilson, 133 F.3d at
263; See generally Schiffer supra note 43; Yount supra note 19, at 609.
16 S.Rep. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1980), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 1980, pp.5019, 5038.
16s Self, 2 F.3d at 1090; Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 540; Hayes International, 786 F.2d at 1402; Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1285-86; Wilson. 133 F.3d at 263;
Kelley Technical Coatings, 157 F.3d at 437-38.
'" Joseph Hutchison, Counsel to the United States Attorney, Remarks to the Environmental Law Class. Quinnipiac College School of Law. Sept.
14, 1999.
167 Stefan A. Noe, "Willful Blindness": A Better Doctrine for Holding Corporate Officers Criminally Liable For RCRA Violations, 42 DePaul L.
Rev. 1461, 1461 citing Jane F. Barett & Veronica M. Clarke, Perspectives on the Knowledge Requirement of Section 6928(d) of RCRA after United
States v. Dee, 59 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 862, 883 (1991).
16 Buckley, 934 F.2d at 88; Self 2 F.3d at 1087, 1088; Haves International, 933 F.2d at 1504; MacDonald, 933 F.2d at 55.
169 Iverson, 162 F.3d at 1025; MIG Transport at 590-92; Self 2 F.3d at 1088; Greer, 850 F.2d at 1451-52; but see MacDonald, 933 F.2d at 53 "We
have found no case, and the government cites none, where a jury was instructed that the defendant could be convicted of afederal crime expressly
requiring knowledge as an element, solely by reason of a conclusive, or "mandatory" presumption of knowledge of the facts constituting the
offense." citing Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263 (1989) (per curiam); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 & n.2 (1985); Hill v. Maloney. 927
F.2d 646, 648 & n.3 (1st Cir. 1990).
170 LaFave et al., Criminal Law, §3.5(b) at 219 (West 2d Ed. 1986).
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he wishes to remain in ignorance.""' Since the doctrine requires some evidence that the actor had notice of facts that
should alert them to illegal activity, the doctrine is therefore relatively narrow and makes subsequent inaction more
culpable. 7 2 The Model Penal Code reflects this narrow construction:
"When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such
knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he
actually believes it not to exist."
The classic case is U.S. v. Jewell, where a person driving a truck from Mexico knew about a secret compartment but
deliberately chose not to look inside and was found to be culpable for smuggling drugs under the willful blindness
doctrine.174 Subsequent decisions have found that the test for willful blindness requires two inferences: " (1) the defendant
was subjectively aware of a high probability of the existence of illegal conduct; and (2) the defendant purposely contrived
to avoid learning of the illegal conduct." The second prong can be proven by either an admission by the defendant of
an intent to avoid knowledge or the circumstances surrounding the facts of the case are "overwhelmingly" suspicious.
In the environmental context, the doctrine of willful blindness is used to circumstantially infer "knowledge" for
essential elements of criminal violations. For example, where the defendant has substantial experience in the industry,
facts like an unusually low cost for hazardous waste disposal, and a defendant's lack of inquiry can be used to show a
conscious intent to remain unaware.'" The Second Circuit in Hopkins noted that:
"A [wilful blindness] charge is appropriate when (a) the element of knowledge is in dispute, and (b) the
evidence would permit a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt "that the defendant was
aware of a high probability of the fact in dispute and consciously avoided confirming that fact."'18
The Hopkins court held that where the defendant was found to have "studiously avoided" confirming the tampering with
samples, as evidenced by such statements as, "I know nothing, I hear nothing" on 25-30 occasions, the jury properly
found him guilty.179 Similarly, where a person tells another to "handle" the disposal of hazardous waste without actually
directly telling them to dispose of it, a court would likely find such person meeting the "knowledge" requirement. 80 Some
courts outside of an environmental context have cautioned against the use of the doctrine out of fear it may blend a
"knowledge" standard into a "recklessness" standard; all courts that have dealt with the issue of circumstantial proof of
knowledge in an environmental context have not found this to be the case.' 8 '
B. Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine
The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine holds that where a corporate officer is in a position to harm the
public health or pollute the environment he or she is individually responsible for their actions.182 The Responsible
Corporate Officer Doctrine was first enunciated in the Supreme Court's decision in U.S. v. Dotterweich in the context of
introducing unsafe medicine into the "stream of commerce" for public consumption; the president of the corporation was
found to be in a "responsible relation" to public health and therefore criminally liable.'8 3 The doctrine was substantially
'"' Id quoting G. Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part 157, 159 (2d ed. 1961).
172 Id. at 219 citing U.S. v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1991) (new) n. 22; Noe, supra note 192, at 1471 citing U.S. v. Lara-Vasquez, 919 F.2d
946, 951-52 (5th Cir. 1990).
17 Model Penal Code §2.02(7) (1962).
U.S. v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9" Cir. 1976) cited in LaFave et al., Criminal Law §3.5(b) at 219 (West 2d Ed. 1986).
1 Noe, supra note 192, at 1471-72 citing Lara- Velasquez, 919 F.2d at 951.176 Id.; LaFave et al., Criminal Law §3.5(b) at 220 (West 2d Ed. 1986) citing U.S. v. Hester, 880 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1989).
Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 541-42; Buckley, 934 F.2d at 88; Self 2 F.3d at 1087-88; Hayes International, 933 F.2d at 1504; Greer, 850 F.2d at 1451-
52; MacDonald, 933 F.2d at 55.Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 542 citing U.S. v. Rodriguez, 983 F.2d 455, 458 (2d Cir. 1993).
7 Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 542.
8s Greer, 850 F.2dat 1451-52 cited in Self 2 F.3d at 1088.
18 Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 541-42; Buckley, 934 F.2d at 88; Self 2 F.3d at 1087-88; Hayes International, 933 F.2d at 1504; Greer, 850 F.2d at 1451-
52; MacDonald, 933 F.2d at 55.
182 See generally U.S. v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 64 S.Ct. 134, 88 L. Ed. 48 (1943); U.S. v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 95 S. Ct. 1903, 44 L.Ed.2d 489(1975).
183 See generally U.S. v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 64 S.Ct. 134, 88 L. Ed. 48 (1943).
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developed in U.S. v. Park where the Supreme Court found that, even though the task of seeking out illegal conditions was
"onerous," where a president of a corporation had knowledge of illegal conditions at one of its food distribution centers,
he was criminally liable for not further investigating and remedying unsafe conditions.184 However, the Park court
emphasized that "the concept of 'responsible relationship' ... imports some measure of blameworthiness," and that while
its burden is significant, the doctrine "does not require that which is objectively impossible." 85
In an environmental context, where a person runs the day-to-day operations of a facility, develops policy for
disposal of waste, or merely has the authority to control discharges of hazardous waste, he or she could be held liable
under the Responsible Corporate Officer doctrine.'86 While all courts would likely consider a defendant's position within
the company as evidence contributing to knowledge, there is a minority view that mere position alone is not enough to
justify felony level penalties.'8 The Ninth Circuit addressed the argument of whether felony level penalties are
appropriate with the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine in its decision in Iverson:
"In 1987, after the Supreme Court decided Park, Congress revised and replaced the criminal
provisions of the CWA. (Most importantly, Congress made a violation of the CWA a felony,
rather than a misdemeanor.) In replacing the criminal provisions of the CWA, Congress made no
changes to its "responsible corporate officer" provision. That being so, we can presume that
Congress intended for Park's refinement of the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine to apply
under the CWA."'88
While the Court in U.S. v. MacDonald & Watson reversed a conviction on the basis of a jury instruction that allowed for
knowledge to rest solely on the defendant's position in the company, the court found that, "knowledge may be inferred
from circumstantial evidence, including position and responsibility of defendants such as corporate officers."18' The Tenth
Circuit Court in U.S. v. Self found that where the defendant was responsible for the day-to-day management of the facility,
oversaw all bills, assisted in acquiring hazardous materials from generators and brokers, could see drums storing
hazardous materials from his office, ordered the doors to the warehouse containing the hazardous materials closed, and in
one instance assisted in closing the doors when informed of an impending inspection, it was proper to charge him with
knowledge of the illegality of his conduct.190 Where a corporate officer is responsible for policies that affect the public
health and environment, they are in a "responsible relation" to them; it is manifestly proper to use the Responsible
Corporate Officer doctrine to circumstantially provide evidence of culpability.
CONCLUSION
The main point of criminal prosecution of federal environmental laws is to hold those responsible who make the
decisions to dispose of hazardous materials illegally. 9' Congress amended major environmental laws to increase
penalties and require a lower mens rea, "knowingly," in response to public concern over the seriousness of environmental
crimes.1 A 'knowingly' mens rea merely means being aware of the conduct that violates the law and does not require
18 See generally U.S. v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 95 S. Ct. 1903, 44 L.Ed.2d 489 (1975).
185 Id. cited in LaFave et al., Criminal Law § 3.10(e) at 267 (West 2d Ed. 1986)186 Iverson, 162 F.3d at 1025; MIG Transport, 173 F.3d at 590-91; Self 2 F.3d at 1088; Dee, 912 F.2d at 747; Greer, 850 F.2d at 1452-52; but see
MacDonald, 933 F.2d at 52, 55.187 Id.; Noe, supra note 192, at 1475; "In a crime having knowledge as an express element, a mere showing of official responsibility under
Dotterweich is not an adequate substitute for direct or circumstantial proof of knowledge." MacDonald, 933 F.2d at 55.
188 Iverson, 162 F.3d at 1024 citing U.S. v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413, 1419 (10th Cir. 1991); U.S. v. Frezzo Brothers, Inc., 602 F.2d 1123.1 130 n. II(3d Cir. 1979); Susan F. Mandiberg, Moral Issues in Environmental Crime, 7 Fordham Envtl. L.J. 881, 895 (1996); Jeremy D. Heep, Adapting the
Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine in Light of United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.. 78 Minn. L. Rev. 699, 702-03 (1994);
Brenda S. Hustis and John Y. Gotanda, The Responsible Corporate Officer: Designated Felon or Legal Fiction?, 25 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 169, 172
994); Barry M. Hartman and Charles A. De Monaco, The Present Use of the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine in Criminal Enforcement of
ivironmental Laws, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. 10145. 10146-48 (1993).
89 MacDonald, 933 F.2d at 55.
9 Self, 2 F.3d at 1087.
91 MIG Transport Services, Inc., 173 F.3d at 590-91; Iverson, 162 F.3d at 1025; Self, 2 F.3d at 1088; Greer, 850 F.2d at 1451-52; Schiffer et al.
supra note 43 at 2535 (1995).
2 Laughlin, 10 F.3d 961; Hopkins. 53 F.3d at 540; Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038; Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1283; Sinskey, 119 F.3d at 716; Yount supra
note 19.
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awareness of the law or its regulations. 193
Some critics argue that the criminal provisions are strict liability offenses, but they ignore the inherently
subjective nature of a "knowingly" mens rea requirement.194 Others argue that environmental criminal provisions are
ambiguous and therefore the rule of lenity should be used.'95 This argument is based in an incorrect interpretation of the
relevant statutes; use of the rule of lenity has not been adopted by any circuit courts for the knowledge element.196
Knowledge can be inferred where hazardous materials are involved,'9 or can be proven circumstantially by the
Willful Blindness Doctrine'" or the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine.'99 In light of the remedial purpose of publi
welfare statutes 2 recent Supreme Court20' and seminal Circuit Court202 decisions, the goal of deterring decision-makers
from illegal activity would be best served by adhering to a traditional construction of a "knowingly" mens rea.
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